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Correspondence
To the Editor:
I am writing in response to a recent Note published by the Journal, Group
Vilification Reconsidered,' which in my opinion is utterly misguided. The
Note is a parody of legal scholarship. It is properly footnoted, relies upon
social science references, and attempts to be analytical, at least in the trivial
sense of dividing everything into three categories. Additionally, the Note is
in at least one important respect factually misleading: although its origin
is obviously the Skokie episode,2 the Note carefully fails to mention that the
"group-vilifying" speech it addresses never, in fact, took place. Speculation
on why that was so might have led the notewriter to a broader view of the
"proper purpose"3 (his words) of the First Amendment.
More important, however, are the shabby or simply erroneous analytical
premises of the Note. Relying on a few social science studies apparently
chosen at random, which are hardly sufficient basis on which to construct
the argument that follows, the Note concludes that group vilification "gen-
erally enjoys a greater measure of persuasiveness than does ordinary group
libel."'4 But who could be convinced by such a statement, at least upon the
basis of the evidence presented, and why should courts or legislatures pro-
ceed to act upon this sort of conclusion? Similarly, the conclusions in the
next paragraph are thought by the author to flow directly from the evidence
he cites, yet the most cursory examination suggests that we are being pre-
sented with opinion, not fact.
Especially astonishing is the assumption that the First Amendment pro-
tects only speech that does not "[bypass] the conscious faculties of its
hearer. . . .-5 The notewriter's theory of the mind, as well as of the political
process, is quaintly eighteenth century. It assumes that everyone operates
rationally and makes political decisions on the basis of rational calculations
from factual speech. We know, however, that such is not so, and both our
law and culture assume just the opposite. The Supreme Court's opinion in
Cohen v. CaliforniaG for example, is devastating to the author's premises.
The very artifacts of our culture-advertising, for instance-are witness to
the fact that information in our society is transmitted both to the "conscious
faculties of the average person" as well as through what I suppose the
notewriter would call "unconscious faculties" (and the rest of us, simple
human feeling). We are not yet "advanced" enough, so far as I am aware,
to have abandoned First Amendment protection for speech that operates
metaphorically or arouses feeling and passion, outrage and anger, hatred
1. Note, Group Vilification Reconsidered, 89 YALI L.J. 308 (1979).
2. See id. at 308 n.2.
3. Id. at 332.
4. Id. at 313.
5. Id. at 317-18.
6. 403 U.S. 15 (1971).
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and shame. Under the Note's meager First Amendment, Daniel Webster
presumably could have been prevented from engaging in his well-known
rhetorical flourishes, because delivery of his speeches, as opposed to their
printing, had appeal beyond the "conscious faculties" of his audience. As
an antidote to this nonsense, I recommend Carl Schorske's recent book, Fin
de Siecle Vienna.7 It describes how politics in the early part of the century
challenged the nice liberal assumptions that the notewriter thinks are em-
bedded in the Constitution, as if they were Spencer's Social Statics.
One of the most disturbing upshots of the attempts by major Jewish
organizations to suppress the First Amendment rights of Nazis in Skokie
were charges by various black groups that those Jewish organizations so
exercised about free speech rights accorded racists had not seemed particu-
larly interested in William Shockley's anti-black speech. The two illustra-
tions at the end of the Note suggest that those criticisms were not just
whistled Dixie. Simple analysis shows that Shockley's view that black in-
tellectual and social deficiencies are "racially genetic in origin" is as sus-
ceptible of verification as is the statement that "the Protocols of Zion are
true." Moreover, consider the statements that "[i]f believed, [Shockley's]
speech could easily have injured the reputation of blacks as a group ....,8
What does this mean, really? The statement is simply innocent of the pur-
poses for which the First Amendment was adopted and of the hopes and
fears that the Founders had for our democracy.
The fact is that Shockley's false statement of facts (which I take them
to be) eventually will result in scholarly attempts to disprove him-which,
in the end, will do more for the reputation of blacks than the suppression
of Shockley ever could. Similarly, the Nazis' loud expression of prejudices
generally repressed by our culture provokes discussion in public schools,
churches, and newspapers that exposes and undoes such prejudice far more
effectively than would the self-censorship, or official censorship, proposed
by this Note. Its "solution," on the contrary, would allow prejudice to fester
unattended beneath the body-politic.
I hope it is clear that I am not proposing a political test for publication
in the Journal. But there is more to legal scholarship than the manipula-
tion of legal jargon and the forms of citation or than the ability to cite a
social science article when a statement of fact looks too general or an
unfootnoted paragraph too sparse.
Very truly yours,
Charles S. Sims
New York, New York
7. C. SCHORSKE, FIN DE SIECLE VIENNA (1980).
8. 89 YALE LJ. at 330.
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The author of the Note replies:
In essence, Mr. Sims makes two objections to my analysis. First, he asserts
that the empirical data that I present regarding the nature and effects of
group vilification' afford inadequate grounds for legislation. Second, he
challenges my interpretation of the First Amendment's proper scope. The
first criticism shows that Mr. Sims misconceives current law. The second
reveals that he understands neither current law nor my argument from it.
Mr. Sims asks "why .. .courts or legislatures [should] proceed to act"
on the basis of my empirical data. The question itself betrays a confusion
between the adequacy of empirical data for the purpose of legislative action
on the one hand, and for the purpose of judicial review on the other. It is
plain that legislatures must often enact laws on the basis of uncertain or
controversial hypotheses of human nature or social realities.2 And it is
equally plain that such laws are constitutionally valid.3 This is so even in
the First Amendment area, where the Supreme Court has recognized that
social-science studies of the nature and effect of obscene speech, even if
controverted by other studies, are quite sufficient to sustain a legislative
proscription of obscenity as a crime.4 Mr. Sims seems to want empirical data
to be definitive before allowing legislatures to regulate any kind of speech.
That position is not only contrary to current law, but it is undesirable as
well. It would prevent a legislature from enacting laws until fresh psycho-
logical or sociological research conclusively disproved existing and fashion-
able theories. It would therefore freeze the law in its current state, perhaps
forever.5 Thus it is Mr. Sims, and not I, who seeks to embed his assumptions
in the Constitution.
Mr. Sims then disputes my analysis of the proper scope of First Amend-
ment rights. But at the outset he misstates that analysis, by ignoring one-
half of it. The Note repeatedly asserts that in order for speech to be un-
protected under its analysis, that speech must not only bypass "the conscious
faculties of its hearer," but also must threaten "serious harm to some sub-
stantial public interest."6 This limitation would of course result in the
prbtection of Daniel Webster's rhetoric. Quite apart from this misstatement,
Mr. Sims' criticism reveals serious misconceptions about current First
Amendment law. He appears to assume, for example, that advertising en-
joys the same constitutional protection as other speech. That is simply
I. See Note, Group Vilification Reconsidered, 89 YALE L.J. 308, 311 nn.16 & 17, 312-13
nn.19-22, 314 n.26 (1979).
2. See Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 61-62 (1973) (citing cases involving
commercial, securities, antitrust, and environmental regulation).
3. See Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 642-43 (1968) ("We do not demand of
legislatures 'scientifically certain criteria of legislation.' ") (quoting Noble State Bank v.
Haskell, 219 U.S. 104, 110 (1911)).
4. See Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 60-61 (1973).
5. On a sensitive and highly controverted subject such as the nature and effects of
obscenity or group vilification, it is quite possible that social-science research will never be-
come so conclusive as Mr. Sims demands.
6. Note, supra note 1, at 317-18; see id. at 318, 322-23, 325, 330, 331-32 (repeating
assertion).
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untrue.1 Further, Mr. Sims finds Cohen v. Californias to be "devastating"
to my analysis. In fact, Cohen buttresses my interpretation. Justice Harlan's
opinion recognizes that Cohen's expression did not threaten serious harm
to any substantial public interest.0 Harlan then concluded that the ex-
pression must be protected. 10 Cohen therefore supports the objective ac-
curacy of the "serious harm" element of my analysis: while Chaplinsky,
Feiner, and Roth show that seriously harmful speech need not be pro-
tected," Cohen establishes that speech falling short of "serious harm" must
be protected.' 2 Thus it is Mr. Sims, and not I, who lacks support in the
case law.
Even without these misconceptions and misstatements, Mr. Sims' critique
would have little force, because it is internally inconsistent. He asserts that
widespread ventilation of the Nazis' group-vilifying speech will somehow
lead to the exposure and undoing of racial and religious prejudice. This
assertion-the "marketplace of ideas" hypothesis-assumes a single, common
currency of discourse. It supposes that human behavior is uniformly the
product of "ideas," that "good ideas" will inevitably drive "bad" ones "out
of business," and that human behavior will consequently improve. But Mr.
Sims also recognizes "the fact that information in our society is transmitted
both to the 'conscious [' and] 'unconscious faculties.'" That is precisely my
point. And if that is so, how can Mr. Sims adhere to the marketplace-of-
ideas view? If some opinions and habits of thought are learned unconscious-
ly, what makes Mr. Sims so sure that reason alone can root them out? In
professing his faith in an "invisible hand" in political affairs, it is Mr. Sims,
and not I, who reveals an eighteenth-century theory of the mind: he
imagines that reasonable anti-prejudice argumentation necessarily has the
power, by itself, to dislodge reflex hatreds nurtured in the unconscious for
millenia. Twentieth-century psychology, not to mention twentieth-century
history, proves him wrong.
-Mark S. Campisano
7. See id. at 322 n.59 (citing cases on "commercial speech"). Obviously, advertising
can be prohibited if it is false, or even only "deceptive and misleading." Virginia State
Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 771-73 (1976).
Advertising is thus much less protected by the First Amendment than other speech is.
8. 403 U.S. 15 (1971).
9. Id. at 19-20 (distinguishing instant case from Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476
(1957) (obscenity), Chaplinsky v. Nei Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942) ("fighting words"),
and Feiner v. New York, 340 U.S. 315 (1951) (incitement to riot)).
10. 403 U.S. at 26.
11. See Note, sutra note I, at 315-18.
12. See id. at 321-22 nn.58 & 59 (citing similar decisions).
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